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Introduction
As demonstrated by the recent nancial crisis, asymmetric information between depositors and banks can cause the breakdown of nancial markets. Empirical studies suggest that the probability of such a condence crisis, i.e., the stability of the banking sector, responds to two factors: changes in the minimum capital requirement regulation (Barth et al. 2006, Laeven and Levine 2009) and to changes in domestic supervision (Mitchener 2005, Buch and DeLong 2008) . However, the focus of regulatory reforms, has concentrated on capital regulation, whereas supervision is still left in the hand of national authorities.
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This paper disentangles the trade-o between higher capital requirements and more supervision by explicitely taking into account both policy tools to secure the stability of a domestic banking sector. Due to the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection, we show that both instruments are needed in order to prevent a banking crisis. Intuitively, both problems result from asymmetric information on the actual riskiness of banks. Capital regulation solves an individual bank's moral hazard reducing the cost of a market breakdown, while supervision reduces the adverse selection problem and the probability of a crisis. Therefore, a regulator minimises the expected cost of a banking crisis via a neo-classical production function with both input factors. However, the cost burden of intervention diers: The cost of increasing capital is born by the banks, the cost of supervision and improvement of the banking sector is assumed to be born by the regulator and, thus, by taxpayers. 4 Interestingly, if we allow for a certain degree of capturing by the regulator, this highly stylised model yields a rich set of results.
First, we examine the optimal regulation of a banking sector in a closed economy that consists of banks, which dier with respect to their ability to control the risk of their investment projects.
If depositors cannot observe the actual ability of each bank, they will deposit less money in banks compared to fully informed depositors. In order to reduce the ineciency stemming from asymmetric information, the regulator now selects an optimal combination of a minimum capital requirement level that incentivises banks to control their risk and supervisory eort that inuences the quality of the banking sector (i.e., the proportion of banks that are able to control their risky investments).
Her choice depends on both the cost of supervisory eort in inuencing the quality of the average bank, and the weight a regulator puts on the rent and the size of the domestic banking sector.
This political economy approach represents a rather broad view of regulation when compared to the prudential framework that is found in most of the existing literature.
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Second, we show within our setting that with institutional competition between regulators, the optimal combination of policy instruments crucially depends on the moving costs and observability of dierences in national regulation in the banking sector. If depositors can fully observe countryspecic regulatory regimes, and are able to dierentiate via adjusted interest rates, jurisdictions evolve into a club supplying a regulatory framework for banks. In such a situation, the regulatory 3 Even after two substantial revision processes, the main focus of the Basel Accords created by the Bank of International Settlements remains the regulation of capital and liquidity standards. Although the regulatory framework encourages the convergence towards common supervisory standards, the rather general implementation guidelines are by far less detailed and matured as the regulation of capital requirements, which leaves national authorities room to incorporate supervisory practices which are best-suited to their own national systems. As a result, one can observe considerable variations in supervisory standards in jurisdictions that are adopting the Basel framework. Regulation diers, for example, with respect to denitions of the requested reporting items, time-tables or technical details. 1 Introduction 3 costs to prevent the breakdown of nancial markets increase with the mobility of banks. However, if depositors cannot distinguish between dierent national regulatory regimes, a deregulation race in capital ratios appears resulting in an even higher increase in the probability of a global banking crisis. Moreover, this implies that competition among regulators causes a rent-shifting between banks and taxpayers compared to the optimal policy mix in autarky which always reduce domestic welfare.
Our results are related to the small but growing theoretical literature on the political economy of regulatory competition in banking. In a globalised world, regulators must take into account that banks seek to go abroad, and consequently must deal with externalities created by mobile banks.
Empirical studies document increased foreign bank entries in many economies; for example, Barth et al. (2006) show in a sample of 91 countries that on average 45% of banking assets were counted for by banks that are more than 50% foreign owned. A recent study by Ongena et al. (2011) provides an analysis of spillover eects of national capital requirement regulation and supervision on the lending behaviour of cross-border banks. They nd empirical evidence that stricter regulation and supervision reduces risk-taking of banks in the home country but increases risk-taking of lending in foreign countries. Their ndings suggest that national capital regulation and supervision may have important spillover eects. Instead of enhancing bank stability, stricter capital regulation and supervision may simply reallocate the risk-taking behaviour to other countries. By contrast, Acharya (2003) discusses the desirability of uniform capital requirements among countries with divergent closure policies. He illustrates that ex post policies can have an incremental eect on the optimality of ex ante regulation and, therefore, must be taken into account when designing prudential ex ante policies. He concludes that, with heterogeneous closure policies, level playing elds can result in a welfare-declining race to the bottom.
The main result of Morrison and White (2009) , however, is the opposite. In their model, a less competent jurisdiction suers from international nancial integration, since good banks ee to the better jurisdiction which can cherry pick the best banks applying for licenses. Therefore, less competent jurisdictions benet from international harmonisation of regulation, though international capital requirements alone cannot prevent the exit of sound banks. One can conclude that the catching-up of the weakest regulator over the best-regulated economy takes place when capital is mobile. Thus, in their view, level playing elds are desirable for weaker regulators.
Our model incorporates both of these ideas, establishing conditions where competition among regulators lead to a race to the bottom in capital ratios or an ecient outcome where the more ecient regulator expects higher volumes of deposits. In contrast to Acharya (2003) , who concentrates on the interlinkage of capital requirement and closure policies, our model focuses on the link between optimal harmonised capital requirements and ex-ante supervisory eorts that will change the pool quality, and thereby the stability of the banking sector within a jurisdiction. Moreover, we combine our results with the political economy literature showing the distributional eects of regulatory competition between taxpayers and the banking sector which create incentives for lobbying activity.
2 Optimal Regulation in Closed Economies 4 Finally, the results from our analysis provide a rationale for the international harmonisation of minimum capital standards à la Basel when banks are mobile. We show that the equilibrium outcome of regulatory competition is welfare-inferior compared to a world with closed economies.
Consequently, there are two driving forces for the international harmonisation of capital requirements: (1) independently of the information structure, harmonised capital regulation counters a regulatory race that lowers national utility, (2) network benets of harmonisation reduce the costs of supervision for national regulators making optimal regulation cheaper. This paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 we introduce our basic model setup in a closed economy showing under which conditions an unregulated banking sector can be characterised as a lemons market where no banking is possible. In order to prevent such a domestic market breakdown the regulator can now use capital standards and supervision. In section 3, we allow for free movement of banks and introduce regulatory competition to analyse the changes in the optimal policy mix. Section 4 summarises our ndings and shortly discusses policy implications.
Optimal Regulation in Closed Economies

Lemons Equilibrium in an Unregulated Banking Sector
We develop our arguments in a one-period model with three types of risk-neutral agents: banks, depositors and regulators.
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Consider a continuum of banks normalised to 1. Banks collect funds from depositors and equity investors in order to nance risky projects. Unmonitored projects return R in case of success with probability p L and zero in case of failure with (1 − p L ). We further assume that a natural fraction θ n ∈ [0, 1) of banks has access to a monitoring technology, which allows them to increase the probability of project success to p H = p L + p > p L at the cost m. We call these banks ecient.
The remaining banks in the national banking sector (1 − θ n ) are said to be goofy.
We assume a huge pool of risk-neutral depositors 7 that can provide an innite amount of deposits. Each depositor, endowed with 1, can either invest in a risk less storage technology yielding a certain return of γ ≥ 1 or lend it to a bank as deposits without any form of depositor insurance. 8
Hence, banks can raise deposits as long as the oered expected return on deposits exceeds the Therefore, the decision to deposit depends on the average quality of banks in the economy provided that ecient banks have enough skin in the game in the form of equity to monitor their projects.
The unobservablitity of the bank's type implies that all banks can refund at the same deposit rate.
This assumption reects information asymmetries between depositors and banks and is in line with traditional banking models and recent empirical ndings:
9 because of banks' opaqueness, a bank's 6 The basic set-up follows Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Morrison and White (2009) with perfect correlation of risk.
7 The assumption of risk neutral depositors does not drive our results but simplies the model. The driving factor for our model is that depositors need to be compensated for expected shortfalls in their deposits.
8 Alternatively, we can assume that depositors are fully insured, but the deposit insurance risk premium to be paid depends on the average risk in the banking sector. A risk-adjusted deposit guarantee system is welfare-neutral yielding the same equilibrium conditions for optimal policy (see Morrison and White 2011).
9 Morgan (2002) provides empirical evidence on the opacity by comparing the frequency of disagreements among bond-rating agencies about the values of rms across sectors of activity. Disagreements are higher for nancial institutions than for other sectors of the economy. 5 type is supposed to be private information and cannot be credibly communicated to depositors. In this context, we model a banking crisis as a condence crisis where depositors are unwilling to give their money to a bank which they select at random.
Optimal Regulation in Closed Economies
In addition to deposits, banks can raise equity to nance their projects. We assume that equity has high opportunity costs and is, therefore, scarce, i.e., ρ > R · p H . The assumption that equity is costly for a bank is very common in the theoretical literature on banking, however, it is not undisputed.
10 One justication for costly equity would be that depositors, compared to equity investors, receive additional private benets for depositing, e.g., depositing creates access to means of non-cash payment systems that helps to mitigate transaction costs, which depositors face in their daily life. In our model, the additional cost of capital also reects the shrinking role of banks as nancial intermediaries. We assume that the existence of nancial intermediation is welfare enhancing. The more banks refund their investments with equity capital, the less deposits they take and, therefore, the less nancial intermediation takes place.
As argued above, due to the opaqueness of the banking sector, depositors cannot observe the individual capital structure of each bank unless national regulation enforces an observable minimum capital requirement standard. Therefore, ecient banks cannot signal their quality by raising additional equity or publishing their prots via balance sheets, which would be a natural solution to the adverse selection problem. Without capital regulation, banks always minimise costly equity capital (to zero). Now we can construct the conditions for the existence of nancial intermediation,
i.e., depositing:
First, monitoring must be incentive-compatible for ecient banks. The fraction θ of banks will choose to monitor projects if the return from monitoring exceeds the return from not doing so, 
This upper bound on the renancing cost is increasing in the value added of monitoring ∂r of an expected unconditional probability that the project succeeds of (p L + θ p).
Anticipating this average probability, depositors are willing to deposit their endowments at the bank if the expected return from depositing exceeds their outside option (r D ) · (p L + θ p) ≥ γ. Therefore, the second condition for depositing is given by the participation constraint from depositors, which gives a lower bound on the deposit rate. Depositors require at least a deposit rate that is equal to, or greater than
10 Admati et al (2011) argue that equity is only expensive because of debt subsidies resulting from an underpriced saftey net and special tax policies. From a social planner's point of view the loss of subsidies imply no (social) cost. 
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In a lemons equilibrium, even banks with ecient monitoring technology would not be able to raise funds and no investments would take place, even though monitored projects could create a positive rent. As a result, the nancial market is unable to channel funds eectively to those who have the most productive investment opportunities.
In the following sections we argue that the market ineciency caused by asymmetric information could be alleviated by two alternative policy instruments: capital standards and supervision.
The Eects of Capital Standards
The introduction of a minimum capital requirement changes the individual incentive constraints of banks. The rst eect of capital concerns the monitoring condition of ecient banks. To see this, note that if a bank refunds each dollar investment by a fraction of capital k, the incentive to monitor changes to (R − r
This tells us that a capitalised bank, which refunds a proportion of its investments with equity, can pay higher deposit rates without violating its incentive constraint. Because of ∂r . Note that the lower bound on the deposit rate of the ecient bank's participation is always above the MIC, since p H > ∆p and the MIC will be violated rst. By contrast, goofy banks will make non-negative prots whenever (R − r D )p H > 0, which is the case for any deposit rate r D ≤ r P CG
12 Akerlof 's (1970) lemons problem describes a market failure that is born by asymmetric information. If consumers cannot distinguish qualities, producers will save production costs by reducing their product quality (moral hazard);
in equilibrium, the qualities produced will be lower than those that would have been oered to informed buyers. 7 in order to be willing to monitor. Therefore, with greater skin in the game, ecient banks can accept higher deposit rates, while still credibly assuring to monitor their projects ex post. 13 Figure 1 illustrates how the monitoring incentive constraint MIC is increasing in k. Without any regulation, depositing does not take place since all depositors prefer to invest in the storage technology instead of lending money to banks. The equity funding rate k * gives the minimum capital requirement rate that establishes nancial intermediation by solving the moral hazard problem of ecient banks for a given required return of depositors r D [θ n ]. However, since equity funding is costly, a higher capital requirement rate diminishes the rents of both bank types. Therefore, it also inuences each bank type's incentive to participate, i.e., the break even point.
The participation constraint of a monitoring bank is given by the non-negative prots condition:
Solving for a maximum deposit interest rate, we get:
Since we assumed ρ > p H · R, the minimum capital requirement must be small enough to keep ecient banks operating:
Goofy banks, on the contrary, will make non-negative prots whenever (R−r
which is the case for every deposit rate
implying a break even capital standard that is equal tok
denote the capital standard that solves M IC = P CG = P CD. For suciently high cost of capital ρ > p L ·m ∆p , we can derive the following Lemma:
13 Note that a lower deposit rate, ceteris paribus, increases a bank's rent. When a bank requires lower rents to compensate for monitoring eort this directly translates into the ability to accept higher deposit rates while still being credibly committed to monitoring. Lemma 
there exists a continuum of minimum capital requirement rates k ∈ k * ,k e that solves the moral hazard problem. Otherwise, capital requirements alone cannot guarantee nancial intermediation,
, it can be easily shown that 0 <k < 1. Therefore, there exists a maximum interest rate r D k that simultaneously makes the MIC (3) and the PCs of each bank type (4), (5) Therefore, crowding out goofy banks by setting a suciently high capital requirement cannot be an equilibrium unless the capital requirement is set such thatk e γ
. From these observations we can dene the depositors' participation constraint as follows:
The depositors' willingness to invest does not depend linearly on the capital requirement, since a bank's probability of success is not aected by the capital structure of the bank, but only by the monitoring incentives of banks and the incentives to enter the market.
14 Intuitively, depositors require a goofy risk premium for the average success probability in the banking sector. By contrast, if the capital standard is above the PC of goofy banks and the MIC, depositors will foresee that goofy banks leave the market (separating equilibrium) and only ecient banks stay in the banking sector.
The PCs of depositors, ecient and goofy banks, as well as the monitoring incentive constraint are plotted in Figure 1 , labels the lowest capital ratio that has to be 14 The fact that higher equity funding does not directly inuence the bank's success probability, is a result of the simplicity of our model, where investment projects default with perfect correlation. One major argument in favour of higher capital requirements is that equity provides a buer against unexpected losses. This could be implemented in our model by a shock to risky investment returns, where a proportion of the projects do not succeed. The more a bank has funded its investments with equity, the bigger the shocks a bank could absorb; in other words, the actual return on investment covers at least the deposit liabilities. However, this additional stability enhancing buer eect does not change our results, but would increase the complexity of our model and is, therefore, neglected. implemented in order to guarantee the existence of a national banking sector. Capital requirements that exceed this threshold can solve the moral hazard problem induced by asymmetric information, but a prohibitive high requirementk e will violate the bank's participation constraint of non-negative prots. It follows that eective regulation is possible within the feasible set k = k * ,k e . Such a policy is welfare-superior compared to an unregulated economy: The expected output of the regulated banking sector is strictly higher. Since the transfer between the bank and the depositor is welfare-neutral, the level of the deposit rate is negligible from a regulator's point of view.
Denition 2. (Welfare) A policy is welfare-superior, if the expected output of the banking sector exceeds the cost of implementation.
One interesting corollary of the model setup is that we observe an implicit cross-subsidy for goofy banks. Ecient banks have to pay higher renancing costs in an opaque banking sector compared to a transparent one; in contrast, goofy banks face lower renancing costs. In other words, goofy banks free-ride on the monitoring activity of their ecient competitors. This positive externality can be interpreted as a cross-subsidy that is equal to
that this has consequences for the reluctance of capital standards: If banks maximise prots,
However, Figure 2 illustrates the second case of Lemma 1 where the natural fraction of ecient banks is too low, and the feasible set of capital requirement regulation is empty k = {∅}. Capital regulation alone cannot solve the lemons market, i.e., regulation cannot implement a situation where ecient banks will monitor and participate. In this case, non-relevant capital standards yield the same outcome and welfare as in an unregulated banking sector. In other words, depositors' condence in the banking sector is so low that only a prohibitive high capital standard k * satises the monitoring condition of ecient banks and the market breaks down. From here on, we assume the natural fraction of ecient banks is very low: without loss of generality, we assume the natural fraction to be zero. As a consequence, the regulator has to interfere and improve the quality of the banking sector. She has to make use of a second policy tool to inuence nancial intermediation: we call this tool supervisory eort.
2 Optimal Regulation in Closed Economies 10 
The Eects of Supervision
We now introduce the alternative policy instrument used to enhance stability and foster depositors' condence in the banking sector, which simultaneously inuences the composition of ecient and goofy banks. The regulator has the possibility to spend resources on supervisory ocers, watchdog institutions, and specialised equipment. Hence, the regulator may control a bank's risk taking behaviour and foster the eciency of banks in a direct way via screening and auditing national banks, via on-and osite examinations, or via disclosure requirements. In terms of our model, supervisory eort is assumed to aect the fraction θ in the closed economy, and thereby the absolute number of ecient banks E. Depositors will encounter this supervisory eort by adapting their beliefs of the overall market quality and, thus, the required deposit rate given that ecient banks have an incentive to monitor. However, supervision is costly and increasing in the number of supervised banks.
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For a given size of the banking sector, we postulate a positive relation between the fraction of ecient banks (as the output of supervision) and supervisory eort. In other words, we endogenise
reecting the supervisory eort e of the national regulator: θ(e) = f [e], θ(0) = 0 where f is a production function for the pool quality in an economy. Given f , the more eort that is spent on running supervisory agencies and institutions to evaluate the soundness of national banks, the easier it is to discover oenses and select out goofy banks G.
We assume that the cost of supervisory eort is continuously increasing in eort, convex, and 2 . Accordingly, the better the screening ability of the regulator, the less eort is needed to raise the pool quality of banks. It is easy to show that an increase in the exogenous screening ability would reduce the costs of supervision ceteris paribus and, thus, the number of goofy banks in the banking sector. It follows that regulators, which face high supervisory eort cost, may allow more goofy banks. This is not because their basic motivation diers, but because their benets and costs dier from a regulator that faces less eort cost. In other words, the eciency of a supervisor's technology determines the composition within the national banking sector.
Thus, the introduction of supervision does not aect the MIC of ecient banks, but changes the composition of the banking sector, and thereby the PCD of depositors. This is because it alters the unconditional probability that a bank is ecient θ and all banks benet from the more eective screening or enforcement provided by regulators because of lower deposit rates.
As a consequence, with closed economies, the rent of the domestic banking sector is greater in jurisdictions with better supervision ability, i.e., lower supervisory costs c [θ] . The highest rent can be achieved only when ecient banks are left in the banking sector, such that θ =1 (though this would imply prohibitively high eort cost). The source of nancing of banking supervision is implicitly assumed to come directly (budget assigned by government) or indirectly (seigniorage) from taxpayers.
16 Intuitively, the size of the domestic intermediation sector is maximised if the regulator extensively engages in supervision with c [θ = 1]: this leaves more protable banks and, 15 The intuition is that regulators have a certain capacity (manpower or time) that allows them to screen only a limited number of banks. It is straightforward that she can enhance the monitoring activities of the banks supervised, if she monitors intensively. While this would be easy for one bank, the more banks supervised, the higher the cost might be. For too many banks, it might not even be possible at all to keep an eye on each bank. Indeed, this means that the expected value of the depositors' alternative investment is more protable than the expected return of ecient bank investments which may be an extreme case, because banking is not at all desirable. However, even if supervision alone can solve the moral hazard problem θ = 1, it might not be optimal because of increasing supervision costs. Note that securing the existence of nancial intermediation with supervision implies decreasing returns to scale.
After having introduced the two parameters of our model that govern the banking sector (directly to increase the number of ecient banks via supervision or indirectly via incentivising monitoring of ecient banks with capital standards), we now analyse the optimal policy mix.
The Optimal Policy Mix
The concern of the regulator is to prevent a banking crises, i.e., the breakdown of nancial intermediation. To reach this goal, she has to balance the cost and benets of both policy instruments.
The marginal cost of both policy instruments are exogenously given, and are driven by the characteristics of the regulator and the specic economy. However, we allow for the possibility that the regulator has a certain preference for both instruments; in other words, she weighs the rent of domestic ecient banks and the rent of the taxpayers.
17 Therefore, the regulator's objective function can be expressed as
constrained by the conditions for monitoring of ecient banks (3), for the banks' participation (4), (5) and the depositors' participation constraint (6 
s.t.
17 Since goofy banks are inecient we assume that the regulator does not take into account their prots.
where r D [θ] labels the deposit renancing cost. The regulator now maximises welfare U and decides how to establish nancial intermediation with the most cost ecient usage of her two tools capital standards k and supervisory eort θ. Partial derivation yields:
The rst derivative with respect to k is always negative for ρ > If the participation constraint never becomes binding before the monitoring incentive constraint,
i.e., ρ < p L ·m ∆p , the regulator will just set k = 1 and save any eort on supervision with θ = 0. However, with k = 1 the bank would lose its function as a nancial intermediary and this trivial solution seems to be rather unconvincing. If equity capital is costly, i.e., ρ > 18 A possible capture of the regulator by the banking industry can be motivated by a rich literature of empirical studies; e.g., Colburn and Hudgins (1996) provide evidence that the voting behaviour of the House of Representatives in the 1980s was inuenced by the interests of the thrift industry, or more recently, Igan et al. (2011) found that nancial institutions that succeeded in lobbying on mortgage lending and laxity in securitization issues adopted riskier investment strategies and thereby contributed directly to the recent nancial crisis.
If the protability of banks inuences the regulator's decision, then there arises a trade-o between spending more costly eort on supervision and allowing banks to yield higher prots.
Intuitively, a policy-maker that gives more weight to ecient bank margins will vote for lower capital ratios, and vice versa. Such a regulator would balance the weighted marginal cost of supervision with the weighted marginal cost of higher capital requirements for the banks.
The regulator's optimal mix of capital requirements and eort spending on supervision depends on her marginal rates of substitution to the corresponding relative prices, i.e., costs. Using (9) that maximises regulator's utility.
Proof. If (4) and (5) are non-binding, and eort costs are suciently high, i.e., if c >
there exists a unique interior solution. For a given level of eort cost, the rst order condition implicitly denes the optimal supervisory level θ * and capital standard k [θ * ] . The detailed analysis can be found in Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 1 comes from the fact that supervising banks reduces the number of goofy banks, and thereby the required interest rate in the domestic deposit market. The bank's incentive to monitor projects increases, and capital requirements can be reduced; optimal regulatory capital standards decrease with the number of ecient banks in an economy. The higher the fraction of ecient banks, the smaller the capital standard that is needed to maintain depositing in a banking sector: Figure 3) . A regulator will balance the weighted protability of ecient banks with the marginal costs of supervision and select an optimal level of enforcement e * that translates into a specic θ. Thus, if k(θ * ) <k(θ * ), then the regulator chooses an optimal supervisory eort that trades o the higher marginal eort cost with the lower marginal cost of capital requirements (and lower levels of nancial intermediation). A jurisdiction in which a high eort on supervisory enforcement is spent has lower optimal capital requirements. However, it is optimal to have stricter capital regulation the less ecient a regulator is in controlling the quality of the banking sector, whereby a regulator's ability in ecient supervision is reected by the marginal costs of supervision. Thus, lower cost eciency in supervisory eort leads to higher optimal capital requirements.
As long as the regulator cares for the prot of ecient banks, increased cost of capital will reduce the optimal capital requirement and increase the optimal eort spent on the banking sector's quality.
Higher monitoring cost decreases the prot of ecient banks which lowers the optimal eort level, thereby increasing the optimal capital requirement. Moreover, the MIC becomes more likely to be binding as well as the participation constraint of ecient banks. The more value added by monitoring, the more likely the MIC holds. In terms of our model, higher prots justify lower capital requirements.
To summarise the main ndings in this section, our model suggests that there are two ways to induce more stability into the domestic banking sector: one is the introduction of minimum capital requirements that reduces banks' margins so that the banking sector shrinks with increasing capital ratios. The other is to spend eort on sophisticated supervision in order to improve the eciency of the banks in the market. We obtained a lower bound for the cost of banking regulation based on the minimal rents necessary to implement both stability and the existence of the banking sector.
3 Optimal Regulation with International Spillovers 15 Our analysis shows that cost minimisation problem of the regulator requires two things: making monitoring protable via capital standards (this ensures the existence of the pie we call a banking sector that is to be divided among depositors and banks), and assuring that no participation constraint is violated (minimising the costs, and thereby maximising the size of the pie). We show that for any domestic regulator, the optimal combination of both instruments that maximises domestic utility to the constraint that nancial intermediation takes place, depends on her marginal rates of substitution to the corresponding relative costs where the rst term is related to the weight the regulator puts on the rent of each interest group. Therefore, the regulator implicitly creates rents by selecting a policy mix of capital regulation and supervisory eort that deviates from the weighting of a benevolent social planner (i.e., φ = 0, 5) .
In the following section, we now investigate the role of institutional competition between regulators on the optimal bundle of policy tools.
Optimal Regulation with International Spillovers
The essence of international competition is that the integration of national markets changes the allocation of banks, and consequently the economic environment for optimal national policies. The institutional framework determines the factors of production for banks. Thus, the following section analyses a regulator's optimal reply to the globalisation of banking markets, explicitly taking into account international spillovers. We discuss the conditions under which systems competition will work properly to improve global stability. In other words, we address the question, when does the invisible hand of institutional competition fail such that there is a need for collective action, i.e., harmonisation of banking regulation à la Basel?
We argue that the eect of systems competition crucially depends on the information structure and observability of dierences in national regulation in the banking sector. If depositors can fully monitor country-specic regulatory regimes, and they are able to dierentiate via adjusted interest rates, jurisdictions evolve into a club supplying a regulatory framework for banks.
19 On the other hand, if depositors cannot distinguish between dierent national regulatory regimes, regulation becomes a lemons good and systems competition will bring about the same kind of market failure that justied regulatory intervention in the rst place: a deregulation race occurs.
Two Heterogenous Countries
In order to discuss regulatory competition, consider two countries i ∈ [A, B] with φ ∈ 0, ci R∆p−m+ci that are linked through bank mobility. With the home country principle in regulating foreign banks and two symmetric banking sectors, we allow banks to nance projects abroad. However, we assume that the regulator in each country diers with respect to her supervisory eciency. More specically, consider country A with eort cost c A and country B with eort cost c B where c A < c B without loss of generality. Ceteris paribus, the ex-ante level of eort, and the resulting share of monitoring banks is θ * A > θ * B , and the respective optimal national capital ratios set by the domestic regulator are
. Note that even though country B has a higher observable capital requirement, the quality of the banking sector is lower, which results in a lower average rate of success. As argued above, a less cost ecient supervisor will compensate her low quality with higher capital 19 The idea that a country can usefully be described as a club that organises the production of club goods goes back to Charles Tiebout (1956 ). Accordingly we argue that a regulatory product like banking regulation is characterised for depositors by immobility, rivalry in use and the possibility of exclusion for outsiders.
requirements. Intuitively, the better the quality of the banking sector, the less capital requirement is needed to discipline the banks.
Facing the possibility to move, banks compare their expected prots from staying in their home country and moving to the foreign jurisdiction. When moving implies switching cost ν, a bank of
, that is settled in country B, will move whenever Π
The Club-view: Observable Supervision in Competing Jurisdictions
In this subsection we assume complete information for all market participants regarding the quality and costs of banking supervision. Consequently, depositors adjust the deposit rates to the average bank quality of the national banking sector and there are additional incentives for banks to move abroad. Facing lower capital requirements in the foreign country, banks that are able to move to another jurisdiction have an incentive to choose the jurisdiction that allows for the highest prots.
A potential entrant will now choose his regulatory environment by trading-o the benets and costs of foreign certication.
Since ecient banks are able to generate higher marginal prots than goofy banks, their rent from moving to the more ecient country is greater compared to the rent for goofy banks.
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Facing, lower capital requirements and more favourable deposit refunding rates, banks in country B have an incentive to either move to country A or at least to refund in country A. Intuitively, the rst decision can be seen as opening a subsidiary, the second as opening a branch. Subsidiaries are separate entities from their parent banks, and are subject to the regulation of the host country, whereas branches are subject to the regulation of their parental bank.
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On the one hand, deposit rates in country A are lower than in country B so banks have an incentive to move from B to A. On the other hand, opening a subsidiary in a foreign country involves higher switching costs compared to opening a branch. Let us denote the cost for moving from one country to the other (founding a subsidiary) as ν M and the cost of staying in the home country, but raising funds abroad, as ν R . We assume that ν M > ν R , i.e., the cost of moving into the foreign country and regulated under this jurisdiction involves higher switching costs than simply raising funds abroad and staying regulated in the home country. Depending on the specic level of switching costs, dierent scenarios arise. Figure 4 summarises the results.
22
Consider rst, the case I where overall switching costs are very low ν R < ν
i.e., it is protable for both ecient and goofy banks to move from country B to country A. In this case, the banking sector in country B disappears, while the banking sector in country A consists of two pools. However, the overall quality of the banking sector in country A is lower than before.
If depositors observe this decrease in banking pool quality, they will require a higher deposit rate compared to autarky. For a given capital requirement in country A, a higher deposit rate will result in less monitoring incentives of ecient banks. In order to preserve the nancial sector, the regulator in country A must either increase capital requirements or spend higher eort on supervision. With convex eort cost, the marginal increase in supervision becomes more costly. Hence, compared to autarky, the regulator in country A will gradually increase the capital requirement compared to the eort of supervision. Accordingly, case I implies a deviation from the optimum in autarky, resulting in a lower overall pool quality and a higher probability of a banking crisis. They conclude that governments can design regulations to favour one structure over another. 22 The derivation of the switching cost thresholds can be found in Appendix B. move to the more ecient jurisdiction, while goofy banks remain in country B trying to borrow from depositors in country A. The eects in this case are similar to case I: nancial intermediation in jurisdiction B breaks down, depositors in country A demand higher deposit rates, and the regulator in country A has to adapt the optimal policy mix. Now, we consider the case III of suciently high switching costs, i.e., ν
. Now, only ecient banks in country B nd it protable to move to and borrow from jurisdiction A. In this case the pool size and quality of country A increases to E A + E B + G A , while country B is left with G A . If depositors can observe this change in the pool of banks in each jurisdiction, they would adapt to lower interest rates in country A due to the enhanced pool quality, while nancial intermediation would collapse in country B. Since countries optimally set their capital requirement at the minimum, such that the MIC holds, country B cannot further increase its capital requirement rate to compensate the risk of depositors. The only possible reaction is to increase eort in supervision which is associated with additional costs for taxpayers in jurisdiction B.
In case IV , no bank has an incentive to move, but both bank types try to borrow in country A. While the pool quality in country A worsens, the nancial sector increases. An increased deposit rate demanded by depositors decreases the monitoring incentives of ecient banks in A, while ecient banks in B still face the high capital requirements and monitor. Hence, in this case, a relatively small (compared to case I ) increase in capital requirements as a reaction to the decreased pool quality prevents the banking sector from a crisis.
Case V describes a situation where only ecient banks try to borrow in the more ecient jurisdiction. In this case, the more ecient jurisdiction exclusively benets from an increase in pool quality and size. The case V I describes autarky.
Thus, if depositors anticipate the migration of banks, and can adjust their country-specic interest rate, we can derive the following result regarding national rents in the non-cooperative equilibrium:
Proposition 2. For a given regulatory policy [k * , θ * ] in autarky, the more ecient the domestic supervision, the higher is the expected volume of deposits. a) If banks are completely mobile, the probability of a banking crisis in the ecient country increases (inecient club competition). b) If there are suciently high frictions to banking mobility, the probability of a banking crisis in the more ecient jurisdiction decreases (ecient club competition).
Interestingly, in our framework banks' mobility seeds a banking crisis. Suciently low switching cost yield the standard result where the banking sector in the less ecient country B always breaks down. However, even in the absence of systemic spillovers on the competing economy A, the movement of banks implies negative externalities on the regulatory policy in A and changes the redistribution.
In order to see how the outcome of regulatory competition aects the rents of the two interest groups, we need to analyse how the optimal policy mix changes. Compared to autarky the optimal minimum capital ratio in country A that prevents a banking crisis is increasing in the mobility of banks. Intuitively, a lower ν M improves nancial intermediation in A, but lowers the pool quality as long as ν R < ν G R , increasing the minimum capital regulation that is required to secure nancial intermediation. Thus, the rent of the banking sector will shrink as a result of low switching costs whereas the rent of taxpayers remains constant. Therefore, with lower switching cost club competition tends to decrease domestic welfare in both jurisdictions. However, nancial intermediation concentrates in the country that spends more supervisory eort. 23 
International Deposit Rates: Unobservable Supervision in Competing Jurisdictions
Now, we assume that asymmetric information makes it hard for depositors to distinguish good regulatory systems from bad ones. The reason is that it is dicult for them to interpret national banking laws in foreign languages which may act in accordance with unwritten cultural habits and which may dier in the degree of strictness with which they implement the rules. Depositors can be expected to have an information decit and, consequently, may demand a xed interest rate independently from the bank's localisation.
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Since individual jurisdictions are not distinguishable and depositors lend their endowments with any bank without knowing the characteristics of its home jurisdiction, we assume the international
. When banks can borrow from a pooled deposit market, but are regulated with k *
this distorts the incentive in both countries. In country B, banks benet from the lower overall lending rate. However, in country A, a higher deposit rate will prevent the ecient banks from monitoring, i.e., k * A (θ * A ) is too low to satisfy the monitoring incentive constraint.
Due to the lower capital requirement rate in country A, both types of banks migrate to A. 24 In other words, in this subsection, regulation is assumed to be a lemons good and depositors can only observe the average supervisory eort and capital regulation of national regulators. The assumption of regulatory policy being a lemons good is not new in economic literature. Sinn (1997) argues that governments only intervene in private markets if the invisible hand fails (selection principle); accordingly, he shows that a reintroduction of a market through the backdoor of systems competition does not work. The situation is similar to the case of high switching costs, where only ecient banks have an incentive to move to country A. By doing so, they face a capital requirement that is too low to compensate them for monitoring. In any case, the regulator in country A is faced with a growing nancial sector that does not monitor. In order to prevent a banking crisis, she has to increase capital requirements. However, the crux of the argument is that the regulator does not benet from an increase in capital requirements since depositors do not punish non-monitoring ecient banks. Proposition 3. With unobservable supervision, there is a race to the bottom in capital standards.
Proof. Country B observes an outow of her banks. If switching costs are low, the whole banking sector disappears. Otherwise, goofy banks remain in country B. However, with an international deposit rate, the reduced banking sector in country B does not break down due to the low pool quality. A regulator caring for the existence of a domestic banking sector will decrease the capital ratio in order to prevent the outow of domestic banks. It is straightforward to see that the dominant strategy in this institutional battle is to slightly decrease the capital ratio oered by the other jurisdiction.
The undersupply of banking regulation appears to be the non-cooperative equilibrium. In equilibrium, the deposit market rate pins down to r D = R − of domestic banking, which is nanced by the taxpayer. Accordingly, if domestic banking policy is not observable, the regulatory cost burden is shifted to the taxpayer.
However, the regulator of country A has to increase the capital requirements to guarantee the monitoring of ecient banks. While country B has an incentive to decrease capital requirements until both countries have equal capital requirements. International harmonisation of capital requirements is desirable for both countries. But with higher capital requirements the regulator in A has less incentives to spend costly eort on supervision, while country B does not need to increase its eort in supervision in the pooled banking world. In other words, the more ecient producer of bank quality spends less eort and hence, the overall stability might decrease compared to the situation of isolated countries.
In general, we can derive that, due to the pooling of deposit rates, regulators have an incentive to shirk, while banks will not monitor. This creates an unstable global economy, where depositors overestimate the average expected repayment. When depositors update their beliefs, the global banking system faces a banking crisis. Again, with cross-border banking both countries will lose in welfare terms compared to the case of autarky. But the jurisdiction with the lowest supervisory costs is expected to be the relative winner of such a regulatory race to the bottom.
The question we posed in this section was whether regulatory competition can avoid the existence of a lemons equilibrium at lower costs by mitigating the ecient banks' moral hazard problem.
We have seen that, with open economies, the political equilibrium is no longer the only result of an analysis of the marginal rates of substitution between the costs of supervision and capital requirements. Instead, it reects the strategic interaction with other jurisdictions in regulatory competition where observable capital ratios become a strategic weapon in the battle for attracting banks. The intuition is that banks seek the most lenient of all possible regulators. In this respect, systems competition turned out to be counterproductive depending on the opacity of international nancial markets. Optimal strategic choices of domestic regulators are rooted in the degree of observability of dierences in country-specic regimes for depositors. If observability is suciently low, domestic capital ratios cannot send any price signals to investors and cannot reward ecient banks in better regulated economies with cheaper renancing.
It is plausible that both jurisdictions have an incentive to cooperate in order to ensure the lowest combination of capital ratios and supervisory eort that is necessary to maintain global banking.
Thus, regulators demand for collective actions in order to govern the global banking sector. This provides an impetus for coordinating capital ratios and striving towards an international standard on banking capital adequacy, which is what we will turn to in the next subsection.
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However, the harmonisation of capital requirements without the explicit contracting of minimum supervision, reduces the incentives of ecient regulators to spend high supervisory eort.
In fact, any minimum capital requirement regulation above the capital requirement will lead to supervisory eort below the individually optimal level. Hence, our model predicts that in the case of the harmonisation of capital requirement regulation, the most ecient regulator will spend lower supervisory eort implying a rent-shifting between banks and taxpayers.
26 Indeed, some authors argue that the genesis of the Basel Accords may support the idea of such a destructive regulatory race (see Kapstein 1991) . In the 1980s, it was said that raising the capital requirements for US banks would negatively aect their international competitiveness unless foreign banks were forced to recapitalise in a similar fashion. In the light of the Mexican crisis in 1982, this provided the impetus for US authorities to push for an international agreement on capital ratios and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision quickly emerged as the ideal forum to achieve this. 3 Optimal Regulation with International Spillovers Second, we discuss the consequences of dierences in individual optimal policy mixes in an integrated nancial world. We distinguish between the two cases of fully observable regulatory eort and capital requirements and internationally harmonised deposit rates, where individual characteristics of countries cannot be observed. In the rst case, we show that international nancial integration increases the nancial sector of a country that is more ecient in supervision, while the relatively inecient country's banking sector shrinks. However, if banks are fully mobile, this may increase the probability of a banking crisis in the ecient country, and, therefore reduce the stability of the global banking system.
In an opaque world, where supervisory eort cannot be observed for each country, we nd that the moral hazard problem of banks cannot be solved. Moreover, regulators may have an incentive to reduce capital requirements in order to free ride on an international deposit rate.
The free movement of banks even worsens the situation. While depositors can only observe the average quality of international banking sectors, banks move to the countries with lowest capital requirements. The result is an unstable global banking sector, where depositors believe that the banking sector is safer than it actually is. If depositors update their beliefs, a global banking crisis arises. These negative spillovers are the more serious, the higher the dierences among countries.
We gain similar eects if we allow for heterogeneity with respect to the weighting of the rent of the banking sector between both jurisdictions, i.e., in the capturing of a regulator. Suppose both country B values capital regulation more highly than country A, but its costs with regards to its equity costs and opportunity costs, in terms of supervision, are the same. As we have shown above, a higher preference for capital requirements is a stigma in regulatory competition resulting in a loss in welfare if we allow for banks' mobility. An obvious implication of this re-interpretation of dierent regulatory bliss points in capital ratios is that institutional competition will decrease stability matters when the dierential of the regulator's weighting for domestic banks in autarky is suciently high between the competing jurisdictions. The larger the dierential [φ A − φ B ], the more likely that competition among regulators has a role to play in destabilising the nancial sector;
or to put it dierently, the laxity in capital standards by only one captured banking regulator makes regulatory harmonisation more likely to be needed in order to prevent a banking crisis.
One solution to the negative eects of free bank movement is an agreement on international capital requirement standards that prevents a regulatory race with other jurisdictions. However, our results suggest that a supranational minimum capital requirement regulation as in the Basel III Accord might give the incentive to the most ecient supervisors to spend less eort in supervision, thereby, missing an important input factor of nancial stability. The ineciency arises from the unobservability and non-contractibility of supervisory standards leading to a destabilising race to the bottom. If countries are not homogenous with respect to their supervisory eciency or degree of capturing, any international capital requirement standard that neglects supervisory eorts leaves room for free-riding and, therefore, might even destabilise the global nancial sector. Thus, our results suggest that the implementation of binding minimum supervisory standards are required in order to secure nancial stability.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The regulator can stabilise the opaque banking sector via a production function with two input factors. Both capital standards k and supervision e combat market ineciencies caused by goofy banks. Thus, the regulator takes only into account the rent of ecient banks with a weighting factor φ, conditional on their incentive-constraint and the participation-constraint of depositors.
Assume that θ is a linear increasing function of eort; thus, eort can be simplied to e = θ, c(e) = 
The rst optimality condition with respect to the capital standard is
The rst term captures the marginal benet of an increase in capital standards resulting from decreasing cost of deposits (decreasing renancing rate and decreasing amount of deposits), while the second term ρ is simply the marginal cost of capital. Since equity funding is assumed to be costly, the marginal benet of lower deposit costs never outweighs the marginal cost. Therefore, the second constraint is binding -the regulator tries to reduce costly capital requirements to a minimum and just requires banks to refund their investments with a minimum requirement that secures that the monitoring incentive constraint holds.
The optimality condition with respect to supervisory eort is In particular, if (1 − φ) · c > φ (R · ∆p − m). For a given level of eort cost, the rst order condition then implicitly denes a unique optimal supervisory level:
This implies a capital requirement level
Taking the partial derivative of the regulator's optimal supervisory eort w.r.t. k, gives
It follows that capital standards and supervision behave as substitutes for the regulator.
B Appendix: Switching Costs
Consider the case where country A is able to supervise her banks at lower marginal costs than country B. Therefore, θ A > θ B , k A (θ A ) < k B (θ B ), and if the characteristics of both jurisdictions are observable by depositors, banks in country A can refund their investments at a more favourable
